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Abstract
Reimbursement for healthcare has utilized a variety of payment mechanisms with varying degrees of 
effectiveness. Whether these mechanisms are used singly or in combination, it is imperative that the resulting 
systems remunerate on the basis of the quantity, complexity, and quality of care provided. Expanding the role of 
the electronic medical record (EMR) to monitor provider practice, patient responsiveness, and functioning of 
the healthcare organization has the potential to not only enhance the accuracy and efficiency of reimbursement 
mechanisms but also to improve the quality of medical care.
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Reimbursement mechanisms for healthcare have included salary, Fee-for-service (FFS), capitation, Pay-for-performance (P4P), and diagnosis-based payment 
(DRGs, diagnosis-related groups). Most countries have mixed 
systems that may include any or all of these mechanisms, 
but no system has emerged as universal, perhaps because of 
the strengths and weaknesses of each mechanism and their 
feasibility within a particular social, political, and economic 
setting. Although these mechanisms remunerate the quantity, 
complexity, and quality of healthcare to variable degrees, all 
could function more efficiently if integrated into emerging 
health information technology (HIT).
Current reimbursement mechanisms have both strengths and 
weaknesses (1). With salary systems, there is no incentive 
for the provision of any particular degree of care. In FFS, 
individual items of care are reimbursed retrospectively, but 
excessive services and unnecessary or inappropriate care 
may be encouraged. With prospective payment or capitation 
systems, such as health maintenance organizations in the 
United States or the British National Health Service, a 
predetermined amount is paid for each patient enrolled. 
Although these systems encourage cost containment and 
preventive care, they may also foster undertreatment, over 
referral of complex patients, and large patient numbers 
per provider to enhance income, increasing workload and 
reducing quality of care. In the DRG system, which has been 
used primarily to reimburse hospitals, payment is based upon 
classification of cases into groups defining the “products” 
of healthcare, with patients in each group assumed to have 
similar diagnoses that require the same amount of services. 
The DRG system, like FFS, attempts to link reimbursement to 
the extent of care provided, but drawbacks include upcoding, 
overtreatment, and excessive readmissions. Finally, P4P 
systems, such as that used in the United States for Medicare 
reimbursement, attempt to link payment to quality, usually 
by comparing performance on defined outcomes to past 
performance or performance of other providers. However, 
linking reimbursement to quality requires substantial effort 
to assess performance on strict measures of the processes or 
outcomes of care.
Ikegami (2) has argued that given the shortcomings of 
salary, capitation, DRGs and P4P systems, FFS is simpler 
to administer since it requires less complex mechanisms to 
ensure appropriate function. He points out that “DRGs and 
P4P require well-designed patient identification, classification, 
recording, and monitoring systems.” Yet the process he 
describes, which characterizes the system of payment 
regulation by a fee schedule in Japan, still requires strict 
processes of documentation, billing, monitoring, physician 
auditing, and fee revision, processes that may also be required 
for capitation, DRGs, and P4P systems and implemented 
in those systems with no less efficiency. The challenge in 
designing a reimbursement system lies not only in the 
selection of appropriate mechanisms but also in efficiently 
obtaining, processing, and utilizing the information required 
to ensure their most optimal functioning.
Any reimbursement mechanism for healthcare should 
account for the quantity, complexity, and quality of care. Since 
providing care for a greater number of patients requires greater 
effort by the practitioner, it seems reasonable to reimburse at 
least partially on the basis of quantity. However, all cases are 
not alike, and a mechanism to adjust for case complexity is 
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required so that care for more complex patients may yield 
greater compensation. Finally, reimbursement for quality 
could provide an incentive for improvement of care that could 
benefit both patients and the entire healthcare system.
It would be difficult for any single reimbursement 
mechanism to reward performance for all three dimensions 
of care, but a combination of mechanisms might 
feasibly do so. Compensation for quantity could utilize a 
capitation mechanism whereby providers are paid either a 
predetermined amount per patient or a salary with expectations 
of seeing a prescribed number of patients. The amount of 
salary or capitated fee could be adjusted for complexity using 
the DRG system. To prevent shortcomings noted above, 
patient volume per provider so adjusted could be limited by 
established target ranges that allow reasonable time for the 
provision of quality care. The base income generated could 
be supplemented by an increment rewarding performance 
on established process or outcome measures of quality tied 
to major DRGs. Performance measures could be designed to 
limit potential overtreatment, undertreatment and upcoding 
based in part upon patient presentation and peer standards 
for treatment. In addition to impacting reimbursement, 
performance below community standards could prompt peer 
review and provider educational interventions.
Obtaining and processing information required to ensure 
the proper functioning of any reimbursement mechanism 
requires the investment of substantial time and effort, and 
limited human resources have likely contributed to the 
inefficiency and even failure of mechanism implementation 
in various settings. However, more optimal use of emerging 
HIT, especially the electronic medical record (EMR), could 
enhance the accuracy, efficiency and ultimate feasibility of 
any reimbursement system.
The EMR has been defined as a repository of patient data in 
digital format (3). Although it represents a major advance 
over paper charting, its use is currently limited to data entry 
for patient care documentation, a task of unproven value (4). 
With rare exception, little emphasis is placed upon other 
potential uses of the information entered. However, this 
information has great potential to provide for monitoring of 
all aspects of medical care, including its quantity, complexity, 
and quality and to link performance to reimbursement. Rather 
than simply using the EMR for documentation, it must be 
utilized to accumulate, synthesize, and analyze data, compare 
it to normative standards, and detect patterns and variances 
that may impact both reimbursement and improvement 
in care. The appropriateness and efficiency of provider 
workflow, evaluation, and treatments could be monitored and 
analyzed. Data accumulated on the quantity of patients and 
their complexity could direct base reimbursement, whether 
salary justification or capitated income. Performance on 
defined measures associated with individual DRGs could 
be tracked for each provider, compared to past performance 
and established benchmarks, and form the basis for incentive 
payments (P4P).
Currently the EMR is used primarily by healthcare providers, 
but it could be used by all stakeholders in the healthcare 
system. Integration of patient-generated data into the EMR 
has been advocated (5), and in some EMRs patients are able 
to view their own medical records, renew prescriptions, make 
appointments and communicate with providers. Patient 
involvement could be expanded to incorporate complaints 
and symptoms, monitor disease course and response to 
therapy, and assess compliance and satisfaction with care. 
Modules for patient education and preventive care could be 
incorporated, and interactive visual presentations, personal 
electronic devices and voice recognition technology could 
facilitate ease of interaction with the record. The information 
entered could be tracked and analyzed to not only improve 
quality but also define complexity, increase accuracy of 
DRG assignment, prevent upcoding and ensure fairness of 
remuneration.
Using the EMR, healthcare organizations, such as hospitals, 
clinics or medical groups, could continuously monitor the 
care process to anticipate changing resource requirements 
and improve the efficiency of care. Data from the EMR could 
assist in the generation of real-time budgets that tabulate 
expenditures, reimbursement, and projected future resource 
allocation. Practice patterns of hospital providers, compliance 
with benchmarks, and patient satisfaction and outcomes may 
be monitored to assist in the quality improvement process 
and assure adherence to standards of certifying bodies.
Funding sources, such as insurance companies or government 
agencies, could obtain data directly from the EMR to guide 
reimbursement. Uniform requirements for information 
extraction and criteria upon which to base reimbursement 
would need to be established, and mechanisms would be 
needed to ensure patient privacy, but transparency for all 
stakeholders facilitated by a common computer system 
could foster fairness, efficiency, economy, and mutual trust. 
Establishment of fees is a complex and necessarily arbitrary 
process that must be accomplished by consensus as dictated 
by local economies, but the computer may facilitate periodic 
fee revision by revealing the complexity and appropriateness 
of care required for treatment of specific conditions or DRGs.
From the standpoint of physicians, current EMRs are 
cumbersome, inefficient, and tedious to use (6). Their designs 
must be made more intuitive, less cluttered with extraneous 
information, and more user-friendly, attributes that have 
been associated with successful EMR implementation (3,7). 
Most EMRs are designed by programmers that do not provide 
healthcare, yet physician practice involves unique work flows 
that are not obvious to nonproviders. Detailed study of 
physician work flows should direct EMR design, or EMRs 
could be designed by practicing physicians with programming 
skills. Aspects of the EMR should be individualized with 
respect to each medical specialty or subspecialty to optimize 
documentation, data retrieval, analysis, and remuneration 
mechanisms specific to that specialty.
Ikegami states that since physicians are not trained to practice 
efficiently, the effectiveness of DRG, P4P, and prospective 
payment systems may be limited (2). However, such 
limitations may be overcome by increasing the efficiency 
of physician practice, a goal that could be fostered through 
use of the EMR in both formal physician training and 
continuing medical education. For each medical specialty, 
the vast majority of physician care falls within a very well-
defined standard range, and the computer can detect practice 
variations outside that range, help monitor and guide practice, 
and provide feedback for continuing education. As part of 
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this process, the EMR could incorporate guidelines, reference 
materials, and rapid online access to major literature databases 
and original articles. Individual patient records could be 
automatically referenced to educational materials by linking 
key words in databases to DRGs within the EMR. Universal 
standardized order sets for common treatments could be 
adopted for each medical specialty and their use within the 
EMR (computerized provider order entry) could help guide 
practice. In this regard, it has been shown that the EMR may 
actually influence decisions made by providers (3).
Optimal reimbursement for healthcare must account for not 
only the quantity of care provided but also the complexity and 
quality of that care. Any mechanisms to do so will require the 
accumulation, synthesis, and interpretation of information 
to guide remuneration while simultaneously enhancing the 
efficiency and quality of care. The EMR is ideally suited to 
play a central role in accomplishing this goal, and investment 
of resources to expand this role is likely to benefit the entire 
healthcare system.
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